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CONFESSIONS AND ADMISSIONS
M. C. SLOUGH*
1E VER since the terms "confession and admission" were coined for evi-
dentiary use, courts have attempted to draw clear distinctions be-
tween them, and all too frequently, judicial opinions have mirrored
slavish obedience to the authority of mechanical definitions. For the
sake of clarity, a succinct, well-put definition may serve a utilitarian
purpose in establishing ready comprehension of a segment of human
experience, but, when detached from actual fact, and the many variables
that fact situations produce, this same definition may stifle the imagina-
tion and inhibit appreciation of practical considerations. Stock definitions
of admissions and confessions lead one to believe that the distinguishing
characteristics are sharply outlined, and if one were to accept this im-
pression as an absolute verity, problems of admissibility would rarely
beg solution. It may be unfortunate that experience dictates otherwise,
but it will readily be seen that a workable rule of admissibility will re-
quire more than a definition for its foundation.
As generally understood, a confession is an acknowledgement in ex-
press terms by a party in a criminal case of his guilt.' Thus defined, a
confession implies an admission of every essential element necessary to
establish the crime with which the defendant is charged.2 An admission
is something less. It is a statement of facts pertinent to the issue from
which guilt may be inferred and which tends toward proof of the ultimate
fact of guilt.3 These definitions serve a worthwhile purpose in the sense
that they aptly describe certain basic, abstract principles in a normal,
conventional manner. However, in the utilization of definitions and the
application of abstract concepts to live situations, one finds that resort
to dogmatic, literal interpretations can lead to automatic distortion of
common sense principles. It is dangerous, therefore, to assume that con-
fessions are of greater evidentiary value than admissions, or that con-
fessions should inevitably be received with greater caution than admis-
sions. One must constantly be aware of the fact that all confessions and
* Dean, University of Kansas, School of Law.
1. 2 Jones, Evidence § 398 (5th ed. 1958). Gulotta v. United States, 113 F.2d 683
(8th Cir. 1940); People v. Garcia, 124 Cal. App. 2d 822, 269 P.2d 673 (1954); Edwards
v. State, 213 Ga. 552, 100 S.E.2d 172 (1957); People v. Sleezer, 9 Ill. 2d 57, 136 N.E.2d
808 (1956); State v. Cook, 188 Iowa 655, 176 N.W. 674 (1920); Whomble v. State, 143
Neb. 667, 10 N.W.2d 627 (1943).
2. Carter v. State, 90 Ga. App. 61, 81 S.E.2d 868 (1954).
3. Morton v. United States, 147 F.2d 28 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 875 (1945);
People v. Connelly, 195 Cal. 584, 234 Pac. 374 (1925); People v. Wynekoop, 359 Iln. 124,
194 N.E. 276 (1935) ; State v. Behiter, 55 Nev. 236, 29 P.2d 1000 (1934).
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admissions will not fit into a common mold, and that the competency bf h
statement offered in evidence cannot be determined on the basis of arti-
ficial classification
Undoubtedly, recognizing that razor sharp distinctions cannot be drawn
between confessions and admissions, Dean Wigmore imported some de-
gree of flexibility into his definition of a confession. He defined a con -
fession as an acknowledgement in express words, by the accused in a
criminal case, of the truth of the guilty fact charged or of some essential
part of it.4 Acknowledgement of subordinate facts colorless with reference
to actual guilt would not be included within that definition but would be
relegated to the status of admissions. Admissions of incriminating force
and persuasive of guilt would be treated as confessions, whereas all other
admissions than those which touch the fact of guilt, would be without
the scope of rules affecting the use of confessions. In expanding the
definition of a confession from its generally accepted meaning as a direct
acknowledgement of guilt to an acknowledgement of some essential part
of the fact charged, Wigmore included within the scope of the confessions
rule all statements which would raise a reasonable inference of untrust-
worthiness. According to the Wigmorean premise, there would be scant
reason for assuming that acknowledgements of subordinate facts would
be untrustworthy for the simple reason that strong motives to distort the
truth would be lacking.
The labels "confession and admission" attached to a statement in any
given case may determine whether the statement is admissible, if in-
voluntarily given. These same labels may determine whether or not a
preliminary hearing should be had on an issue of voluntariness. If a pre-
liminary hearing is required in the instant situation, one may have to
choose between labels to solve problems inherent in adjusting burdens of
proof. Necessity of corroboration or of submission of proof establishing
the corpus delicti may rest upon a decision as to whether the statement
made should be categorized as a confession or admission. If a violation
of due process be involved, an appellate tribunal may predicate reversal
upon a determination that the statement in question is a confession in-
stead of an admission. It can readily be appreciated that major policy
4. 3 Wigmore, Evidence § 821 (3d ed. 1940). See Louette v. State, 152 Fla. 495, 503, 12
So. 2d 168, 172 (1943), which states that the "better rule" is that the term confession does
not apply to a mere admission or declaration of an independent fact which tends to prove
guilt or from which guilt may be inferred. On the other hand, courts have ruled that all
incriminating admissions, as distinguished from admissions of subordinate fact, should be
subject to tests of admissibility applicable to full confessions. People v. Heide, 302 III.
624, 135 N.E. 77 (1922); Winchester v. State, 163 Miss. 462, 142 So. 454 (1932). See
Notes, 39 J. Crim. L., C. & P.S. 743 (1949); 4 Kan. L. Rev. 108 (1955); 19 Temp. L.Q.
485 (1946).
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decisions can be posited upon a choice of definition, and if the choice be
carelessly arrived at, unfair judicial decisions inevitably result. Without
doubt, judges and lawyers alike are inclined to seek refuge in a formula
that offers solution in terms of precedent, but it is equally apparent that
the abstract reasoning of a precedent may tempt a poor solution when
analogies between fact situations are strained. Fundamental notions of
fairness dictate that abstract rules and considerations, fathered by ill-
fitting precedents, can never produce a just appraisal of even the ordinary
fact situation. Analysis of case precedents reveals that far too much em-
phasis is placed upon the signficance of verbal distinctions at the expense
of careful examination of basic issues. As conflicts of judicial opinion
multiply, it is no wonder that just or unjust results must depend upon
the accident of jurisdiction.
REQUIREMENT OF VOLUNTARINESS: DECISIONS IN CONFLICT
The injustice and cruelty resulting from the early practice of extorting
confessions from accused persons eventually led to the development of
certain precautionary rules aimed at controlling the admissibility of con-
fessions. The theory employed for rejecting confessions improperly ob-
tained is not always clear, though there are numerous statements in
judicial opinions that the reason for rejection is the danger that confes-
sions of this type will be untrustworthy or involuntary.5 From a practical
standpoint, it would seem that the choice of test would make little dif-
ference since the type of force, threat or promise considered to render
a confession involuntary would in all probability be considered sufficient
to render a confession untrustworthy.6 Wigmore has contended that the
inherent lack of trustworthiness of confessions lies in the fact that this
type of statement is susceptible of being made "under the direct and
palpable pressure of an inducement to substitute something else than the
truth."7 To some extent, the lack of trustworthiness theory is given sup-
port in the precedents allowing all or a portion of an improperly induced
5. Dean Wigmore has condemned the test of voluntariness as historically incorrect,
contending that those who sponsor the test of involuntariness do so under the erroneous
impression that there is an association between the confession rule and the privilege
against self-incrimination. 3 Wigmore, Evidence §§ 823-27 (3d ed. 1940). Other authori-
ties, including Dean McCormick, have established a kinship between the confession rule
and the privilege against self incrimination, and therefore interpret the rule of voluntari-
ness as an indication that rules of restriction are prompted by a desire to protect the
subject against torture, as well as by a desire to safeguard trustworthiness of evidence sub-
mitted. McCormick, Some Problems and Developments in the Admissibility of Confessions,
24 Texas L. Rev. 239 (1946).
6. Inbau, Lie Detection and Criminal Interrogation 150 (1948).
7. 3 Wigmore, Evidence § 815, at 229 (3d ed. 1940).
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confession to be received where subsequent investigation has revealed
the truth of statements made."
In 1936 the Supreme Court for the first time invoked the fourteenth
amendment as a protection against the reception of involuntary confes-
sions, and since that date the Court has progressively broadened the con-
cept of involuntariness.9 At this juncture, reception of an involuntary con-
fession procured by practices violative of the fourteenth amendment may
well void a conviction, no matter how persuasive other evidence of guilt
may be. Despite strong sentiments expressed in favor of the accused
faced with a confession of guilt, there are many who contend that rules
of exclusion, whatever their basis, should not apply to the reception of
involuntary admissions. It is regrettable that this point of view has ob-
tained such unstinted support in judicial circles, and particularly so in
light of an obvious failure to draw thoughtful distinctions between con-
fessions and admissions.
In a majority of jurisdictions, admissions are received as competent
evidence though tainted with involuntariness. For example, in State v.
Spe'ncer,10 the accused had made certain incriminating admissions which
were recorded on a wire recorder and played to the jury over his objec-
tions. Ruling that the evidence was competent, the Supreme Court of
Idaho stated:
We are not concerned here with the necessity on the part of the state of proving
that a confession was voluntarily made before the same is admissible in evidence....
His statements did not constitute a confession but at most might be construed as
admissions against interest .... There was no duty upon the state to put ifi proof
of the voluntary nature of such admissions before the same became admissible in
evidence. 1
The California courts have consistently ruled that admissions need
not be voluntarily made as a condition to being received in evidence.
People v. Garcia'2 concerned a review of a conviction for possession of
8. When subsequent facts reveal the verity of an involuntary confession, courts dis-
agree with respect to policies of admission. Wigmore appears to favor a rule admitting
the entire confession to accompany the facts. 3 Wigmore, Evidence § 857 (3d ed. 1940).
The English decisions generally admit only that part of the confession relating to the
corroborating facts. Apparently, most American jurisdictions adhere to a rule admitting no
part of the confession but only the facts discovered thereby. For case authorities, see
Comment, 6 De Paul L. Rev. 277 (1957). On the other hand, if requirements of due
process are not met, it is highly probable that reversal will be in order if a confession
is admitted, regardless of other evidence pointing to the truth of matters asserted in the
confession itself. These factors are amplified at page 112 infra.
9. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
10. 74 Idaho 173, 258 P.2d 1147 (1953).
11. Id. at 180, 258 P.2d at 1152.
12. 124 Cal. App. 2d 822, 269 P.2d 673, cert. denied, 348 U.S. 901 (1954), 350 U.S.
1959]
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narcotics. The accused had made statements relating to where he had
obtained the "stuff" and where he was taking it. The California court
conceded that the statements reflected a consciousness of guilt, but held
that they amounted only to admissions of fact which could not be char-
acterized as a confession or outright acknowledgement of guilt of the
offense charged. Under these circumstances, it was not necessary to show
that the statements were freely and voluntarily made.
Many statements, though admissions in a strict sense since they fall
short of a complete acknowledgement of guilt, have been admitted in
spite of a strong aura of untrustworthiness. An Iowa decision, State v.
Cook,'" serves as an adequate example. The defendant was convicted of
an attempt to break and enter a dwelling at night with intent to commit
larceny. While he was allegedly trying to break into the house, a woman
saw him and screamed, frightening the defendant away. Subsequently,
the defendant was transported to the scene of the alleged crime, and
while there, he was heard to say: " 'That is the house. I tried to get in,
but was frightened away by the woman's scream.' "'i The court ruled
that the confessions rule was inapplicable because the statement sup-
ported no outright admission of criminal intent. Similarly, a Massa-
chusetts court held that a statement by an accused, indicted for adultery,
that he was guilty as charged was not to be treated as a confession but
as an admission when the statement was later offered against him in a
prosecution for incest based on the same act of intercourse. 5 In a New
Mexico case, a defendant charged with bigamy stated that he had pre-
viously been married but did not know whether he had been divorced
from his first wife. He made no admission with regard to a subsequent
marriage. Since there was no direct admission of a second marriage, the
statement was not a confession, and the court saw no need for a pre-
liminary hearing on the matter of voluntariness. 16
That the borderline between admissions and confessions is a shadowy
one is well illustrated in a decision by the Supreme Court of North
Dakota.' The defendant was on trial for the murder of her husband and
1000 (1956). See also People v. Shannon, 203 Cal. 139, 263 Pac. 522 (1928); People v.
West, 34 Cal. App. 55, 93 P.2d 153 (1939).
13. 188 Iowa 655, 176 N.W. 674 (1920).
14. Id. at 661, 176 N.W. at 677. Assume that the defendant had said: "That is
the house. I tried to break in to steal some money and I was frightened away." Would
this statement be entitled to less credit than the statement actually made in the instant
case? See Morgan, Admissions, 12 Wash. L. Rev. 181, 190 (1937).
15. Commonwealth v. Haywood, 247 Mass. 16, 141 N.E. 571 (1923). This statement
was admitted without preliminary hearing as to its voluntary character. Apparently, the
statement did not constitute an express acknowledgement of the precise crime charged since
it did not contain the essential acknowledgement as to the degree of consanguinity.
16. State v. Lindsey, 26 N.M. 526, 194 Pac. 877 (1921).
17. State v. Gibson, 69 N.D. 70, 284 N.W. 209 (1939).
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claimed that the wound had been self-inflicted. She signed a statement in
which she admitted that she killed her' husband 'to protect her daughter.
The court ruled that her statement was not an acknowledgement of guilt
in express terms. Everything she stated could be taken as true, and yet,
the defendant might not be guilty of any crime. If she had killed her
husband while he was attempting to ravish her daughter, and the de-
fendant reasonably believed that her daughter was in real danger, she
would have committed no crime. 18 A recent decision by the Supreme
Court of Delaware provides an interesting contrast. 9 Having been in-
dicted for murder in the first degree, the defendant was found guilty of
second degree murder and appealed her conviction. She had made a writ-
ten statement in which she admitted shooting and killing her husband, but
she indicated that she was afraid of the deceased because he was a knife-
wielder and further stated that he 'threatened her life just prior to the
killing. The trial judge, in instructing the jury, included the usual charge
with respect to a confession of guilt, noting that the confession must
have been given voluntarily. On appeal, the defendant maintained that
she was prejudiced in the mind of the jury by the judge's characterization
of the written statement as a confession. In effect, she claimed that her
statement was exculpatory and made in justification of the homicide. The
appellate court held that a statement by a defendant, containing admis-
sidni of facts which together constitute proof of the commission of the
homicide charged, was a confession. The confession would be admissible
as such even though additional facts were asserted in the statement by
way of justification of the crime, if the additional facts were insufficient
as a matter of law to establish a defense. Had this been a "mere admis-
sion," proof of voluntariness would not have been necessary.
Several jurisdictions, undoubtedly a minority, hold that admissions
and confessions are both subject to exclusion if given involuntarily. In
a Florida case, .Louette v. State,20 the defendants, while under arrest and
in custody, made certain highly incriminating admissions to an officer.
At trial, the officer testified over the defendant's objection as to the state-
ments made, and the question arose on appeal as to whether the trial
judge erred in admitting this testimony without first, in the absence of
the jury, inquiring into the circumstances under which the admissions
were made. Holding that admission of these statements constituted error,
18. Subsequent legislation in North Dakota annuls the effect of this decision by pro-
viding that: "Any statement, admission, or confession procured from any person charged
with crime in a state court, which was obtained by duress, fraud, threat, or promises,
shall not be admissible in evidence against said person in any criminal action." N.D. Rev.
Code § 29-21121 (Supp. 1957).
19. Brown v. State, 48 Del. 427, 105 A.2d 646 (1954).
20. 152 Fla. 495, 12 So. 2d 168 (1943).
1959]
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the Supreme Court of Florida ruled that a preliminary showing of volun-
tariness must be made and that the question of voluntariness should be
more stringently appraised when admissions are made to an officer, as
distinguished from a private person. It was the duty of the trial court to
make an independent investigation of voluntariness in the absence of
the jury. Likewise, the Alabama decisions in point have consistently
alluded to the fact that both confessions and inculpatory admissions are,
prima facie, involuntary and inadmissible, thus assuming that the accused
is entitled to a preliminary hearing as to the voluntariness of admissions
made.2
The instant problem was brought to focus before the United States
Supreme Court in the celebrated case of Askcraft v. Tennessee.2 2 The
defendant's wife was murdered, and one Ware was convicted for the
murder, Ashcraft being convicted as an accessory before the fact. Ash-
craft was taken into custody and questioned for thirty-six hours. Ac-
cording to one officer's testimony, Ashcraft denied complicity in the crime
for twenty-eight hours. Finally he confessed that he knew who killed his
wife, but denied that he had done it. He stated that he had seen Ware
force the victim into the Ashcraft automobile and drive away. Ashcraft
indicated that his failure to inform the police derived from his fear of
Ware. The confession was admitted in the state court, but the Supreme
Court held that the confession was obtained in violation of due process
and reversed the state conviction, remanding the case for a new trial. In
the second trial, the state introduced testimony as to everything which
took place during the thirty-six hour period of interrogation, eliminating,
however, reference to the coerced confession. Evidence introduced at the
second trial did include the admission by Ashcraft that he knew who
killed his wife. The defendant was convicted as an accessory before the
fact, and on appeal, conviction was affirmed by the state supreme court.23
On certiorari, the Supreme Court of the United States reversed and
remanded for further proceedings, holding that the admission was ob-
tained in violation of due process and that it was error to introduce it in
evidence. 4 Mr. Justice Black, in a strong and assertive opinion, noted
that, in the context of this case, the admissions made were the strongest
possible evidence against Ashcraft who was charged with being an ac-
21. McGuire v. State, 299 Ala. 315, 194 So. 815 (1940) (inculpatory admission with
respect to conspiracy to rob; defendant entitled to preliminary hearing as to voluntari-
ness). However, when facts and circumstances clearly establish that statement was made
without fear or hope of reward, necessity of laying a formal predicate is obviated. Greer
v. State, 26 Ala. App. 522, 60 So. 2d 358 (1952).
22. 322 U.S. 143 (1944).
23. The opinion of the Supreme Court of Tennessee is unreported.
24. Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 327 U.S. 274 (1946).
[Vol. 28
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cessory before the fact. No relevant distinction was drawn between intro-
duction of this statement and the previous confession, except the pos-
sibility that the admission of long concealed knowledge was a more
effective confession of guilt than the written confession itself.
A subsequent decision by the Supreme Court casts some doubt upon
the validity of the holding in the Ashcraft case without specific mention
of the prior decision. The majority opinion in Stein v. New York25 noted
that while the State of New York may impose the same requirements for
admissibility on an admission as it does for a confession, such utterances
are not usually subject to the same restrictions on admissibility as are
confessions. The opinion by Mr. Justice Jackson concludes that, in the
face of the weight of authority to the contrary, no such requirement [with
respect to the admissibility of admissions] is imposed by the fourteenth
amendment. -6
In commenting upon the New York requirements for admissibility, the
majority opinion referred to People v. Reilly. 7 The defendant in this
case had been charged with assault. He was brought to the office of the
district attorney, and in seeking to secure a statement, a Catholic priest,
in the presence of an assistant district attorney, informed the defendant
that there was no danger that any statement might be used against him.
The defendant then made a lengthy statement which was subsequently
used to point up a contradiction in his testimony at the trial. Holding
that the statement could not be used against the defendant in such man-
ner, the appellate division ruled that the statement was incompetent evi-
dence regardless of the fact that it would be considered an admission as
distinguished from an absolute confession. Section 395 of the New York
Code of Criminal Procedure provides that a confession so induced shall
not be admissibleP8 therefore the court had construed the language of
this legislative restriction to include admissions. The court of appeals af-
firmed the decision of the appellate division but based its decision upon
different grounds.29 Apparently rejecting the confession-admission theory
of the lower court, the court of appeals ruled that the defendant's state-
ment was not to be construed as a confession within the meaning of Sec-
25. Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953).
26. Id. at 162 n.5.
27. 181 App. Div. 522, 169 N.Y. Supp. 119, aff'd, 224 N.Y. 90, 120 N.E. 113 (1918).
28. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 395 provides: "A confession of a defendant . . . can be
given in evidence . . .unless made under the influence of fear produced by threats, or
unless made upon a stipulation of the district attorney, that [the defendant] shall not be
prosecuted. ... .
29. In 224 N.Y. 90, 120 N.E. 113 (1918), the court based its decision entirely upon the
agreement which the assistant district attorney was held to adopt, thus insisting that the
state had a duty to abide by its agreement.
1959]
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tion 395 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It further held that the
statement was more in the nature of an exculpatory narrative.
Legislation exists in several jurisdictions, similar in content to the
New York code provision, inhibiting oppressive or coercive practices de-
signed to secure confessions." As a rule, these statutes simply enact the
common law doctrine that confessions induced by threat or fear are in-
admissible and have, therefore, effected little change in traditional con-
cepts of admissibility. Some serious legislative attempts have been made
to soften the shock of coercive police investigation, and the very detailed
provisions of the Kentucky and Texas statutes bear witness to the fact
that reasonable standards may be effected through legislative action. 31
However, these statutes rarely make definite reference to admissions or
incriminating statements not amounting to confessions; hence it is highly
likely that admissions will not be excluded unless case precedent dictates
otherwise.
For example, the Kentucky Anti-Sweating Act forbids peace officers to
attempt to obtain information by "plying with questions" and expressly
excludes confessions so obtained, but no mention is made of admissions. 2
The Texas statute refers to confessions only, yet the decisions in that
state have ruled that inculpatory statements or admissions do come within
the statutory rule prohibiting the use of confessions.3" A Louisiana statute
provides that confessions obtained by threat or promise are inadmissible,
and by its own wording, the statute is not applicable to admissions not
involving the existence of a criminal intent.3 4 It naturally follows, there-
fore, that in Louisiana admissions involving the existence of a criminal
intent are governed by the rules applicable to confessions.35 A recent leg-
30. See statutes collected in 3 Wigmore, Evidence § 831 (3d ed. 1940).
31. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 422.110 (Baldwin 1955); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 726
(1941).
32. The Kentucky Anti-Sweating Act excludes confessions obtained by prying peace
officers, but does not ban questioning about the crime altogether. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 422.110 (Baldwin 1955). See McClain v. Commonwealth, 284 Ky. 359, 144 S.W.2d 816
(1940) (160 questions asked by a county attorney while visiting jail were held to be no
violation of a provision against plying with questions). The Kentucky courts have drawn
a distinction between confessions and admissions when considering provisions of state law
requiring prolof independent of confessions to convict. Hedger v. Commonwealth, 294 Ky.
731, 172 S.W.2d 560 (1943).
33. Any fact or circumstance involved in a statement made by a defendant in jail or
under arrest, when he has not been cautioned, comes within the statutory rule pertaining
to confessions, although the statement made may not be technically a confession or ad-
mission, Silver v. State, 110 Tex. Crim. 512, 8 S.W.2d 144 (1928); Stanchel v. State, 89
Tex. Crim. 358, 231 S.W. 120 (1921). 2 McCormick & Ray, Texas Law of Evidence § 1123
(1956).
34. La. Rev. Stat. §§ 15:449-54 (1950).
35. State v. Domino, 234 La. 950, 102 So. 2d 227 (1958).
[Vol. 28
CONFESSIONS AND ADMISSIONS
islative enactment in North Dakota unambiguously provides that any
statement, admission or confession obtained by duress, fraud, threat, or
promise shall be inadmissible.30 No distinction is made between admis-
sions of an incriminatory nature and those relating to subordinate facts.
Hence, it was probably the intent of the legislature to ban any shred of
evidence procured by extreme measures in the hope that overly ambitious
investigatory procedures would be discouraged.
BURDEN OF PROOF
When the prosecution offers a confession in evidence, the defendant
may object on the ground that the confession was made involuntarily.
The question then arises as to which party has the burden of proving
voluntariness or involuntariness, as the case may be. Decisions are in
conflict with respect to the proper allocation of the burden, and it would
be very difficult to predict the trend of judicial support. In some juris-
dictions, a confession is generally presumed to have been given volun-
tarily, in which case the burden of proof would be placed upon the de-
fendant to prove that the confession was involuntary.37 It is sometimes
said that a confession of guilt made by a defendant to an arresting officer
is deemed prima facie voluntary.3" Other decisions to the contrary hold
that the burden of proving voluntariness should rest upon the prosecu-
tion,"2 or that confessions are prima facie involuntary4
Assuming that logic and a sense of practicality should place the burden
upon the prosecution to prove the voluntariness of a confession, there is
room for argument as to whether the same rule should apply for proving
the voluntariness of an admission. It goes without saying that the usual
preliminary hearing on issues of voluntariness is an expensive, time con-
suming procedure, and it cannot be denied that time expended in de-
termining the voluntariness of a pressured confession is not time wasted.
If it is assumed, however, that admissions are less likely to be induced
by extreme pressures or threats and are less damaging to the interests of
36. N.D. Rev. Code § 29-21121 (Supp. 1957).
37. Wallace v. State, 235 Ind. 538, 135 N.E.2d 512 (1956); State v. Webb, 239 Iowa
693, 31 N.W.2d 337 (1948); State v. Hamer, 240 N.C. 85, 81 S.E.2d 193 (1954); Phillips v.
State, 330 P.2d 209 (Okla. Crim. 1958).
38. Commonwealth v. Jokinen, 257 Mass. 429, 154 N.E. 189 (1926).
39. People v. Speaks, 156 Cal. App. 2d 25, 319 P.2d 709 (1957); Bruner v. People, 113
Colo. 194, 156 P.2d 111 (1945); State v. Lorain, 141 Conn. 694, 109 A.2d 504 (1954);
People v. Rogers, 413 Il. 554, 110 N.E.2d 201 (1953) ; Harris v. State, 162 Tex. Crim. 498,
286 S.W.2d 936 (1956). In People v. Stein, 346 U.S. 156, 173 (1953), the New York State
jury was instructed that they must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the confessions
submitted were voluntary before having a right to consider them as evidence. The burden
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt was placed upon the state. See Annot., 102 A.L.R.
641 (1936); Annot., 38 A.L.R. 116 (1925).
40. White v. State, 260 Ala. 328, 70 So. 2d 624 (1954).
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the accused, one may validly assert that the burden of producing evidence
of involuntariness should be allocated to the defense. It is Dean Mc-
Cormick's opinion that courts may mean no more than this when they
hold that an admission need not be proved to have been made voluntarily,
or that preliminary hearings need not be held on voluntariness when ad-
missions are offered.4' It is to be regretted that the purpose of decisions
in point is so rarely defined. It is the opinion of this writer that problems
of allocating burden of proof with respect to admissions are resolved by
precedents which either require or do not require proof of voluntariness
as a condition for offering extrajudicial admissions. In Alabama, for
example, confessions and inculpatory admissions are prima facie involun-
tary and inadmissible, and preliminary proof of voluntariness must be
submitted by the state.42 No magic lines are drawn between confessions on
one hand and admissions on the other, and the prosecution must prove
the absence of undue pressures in both instances. However, in a jurisdic-
tion such as Utah, where preliminary showings of voluntariness with
respect to admissions are unnecessary, it can often be assumed that
neither the prosecution nor the defense has the burden for the simple
reason that admissions are received despite a strong aura of involun-
tariness.43
CORROBORATION
In order to prevent error in convictions based upon untrue confessions,
the great majority of American jurisdictions have ruled that confessions
must be corroborated to sustain a conviction.4 Though it is not necessary
that a confession be corroborated by independent proof in all its details
and particulars, corroborating evidence must confirm and strengthen the
41. McCormick, Evidence § 113 (1954).
42. Davis v. State, 257 Ala. 447, 59 So. 2d 592 (1952). Inculpatory admissions as to
collateral facts, however incriminating, have been held admissible without preliminary proof
of voluntariness. Whitehead v. State, 16 Ala. App. 427, 78 So. 467 (1918).
43. "Although there are some cases to the contrary, the great weight of authority and
the better-reasoned cases hold that before receiving an admission-as distinguished from
a confession-in evidence, it is not necessary that a preliminary showing be made to the
effect that the statement was voluntary." State v. Masato Karumai, 101 Utah 592, 602,
126 P.2d 1047, 1052 (1942).
44. Daeche v. United States, 250 Fed. 566 (2d Cir. 1918); Gallegos v. State, 152 Neb.
831, 43 N.W.2d 1 (1950); People v. Louis, 1 N.Y.2d 137, 134 N.E.2d 110 (1956); State
v. Johnson, 95 Utah 572, 83 P.2d 1010 (1938); Annot., 45 A.L.R.2d 1316 (1956). Formerly
in England, a defendant's confession was sufficient by itself to support a conviction. How-
ever, later English cases have required some independent confirming evidence to support
confessions in homicide, larceny and bigamy cases. Massachusetts and Wisconsin, alone
among American jurisdictions, disclaim any rule requiring corroborating evidence. Com-
monwealth v. Kimbal, 321 Mass. 290, 73 N.E.2d 468 (1947); Potman v. State, 259 Wis.
234, 47 N.W.2d 884 (1951). See 7 Wigmore, Evidence §§ 2070, 2071 (3d ed. 1940); Note,
103 U. Pa. L. Rev. 638 (1955).
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force of the confession.4 5 Whereas decisions are practically unanimous in
their acceptance of the corroboration requirement, there is considerable
divergence of sentiment among the various jurisdictions as to the quantum
of proof required to corroborate. Currently, evidence of proof of the
corpus delicti in addition to the defendant's confession is required by
statute in at least nine states. 46 An identical requirement is imposed by
judicial decision in a majority of states and federal circuits. 47 Those
jurisdictions requiring proof of the corpus delicti will generally define
corpus delicti as including the first two elements of the crime, i.e., the
injury and the criminality," yet, some decisions can be found defining
corpus delicti as composing all three elements of the crime, including the
defendant's participation.49
Some courts have perpetuated a strict, inflexible rule of procedure
which requires that proof of the corpus delicti be completely independent
of the defendant's confession.6 0 Many of the decisions following this
inflexible rule have imposed an added requirement to the effect that in-
dependent proof of the corpus delicti must precede the introduction of
the confession. 1 On the other hand, reversal of the order of proof will
45. People v. Lueder, 3 IlN. 2d 487, 121 N.E.2d 743 (1954).
46. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 43-2115 (1947); Ga. Code Ann. § 38-420 (Rev. ed. 1954);
Iowa Code Ann. § 782.7 (1950); Ky. Crim. Code Ann. § 240 (Baldwin 1953); Minn.
Stat. Ann. § 634.03 (1947); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 94-2510 (1949); N.Y. Code Crim.
Proc. § 395 (1958); N.D. Rev. Code § 12-2729 (1943); Ore. Comp. Laws Ann. § 26-937'
(1940).
47. See, e.g., United States v. Angel, 201 F.2d 531 (7th Cir. 1953); United States v.
Markman, 193 F.2d 574 (2d Cir. 1952); Pate v. State, 36 Ala. App. 688, 63 So. 2d 223
(1953) ; People v. Mehaffey, 32 Cal. 2d 535, 197 P.2d 12, cert. denied, 335 U.S. 900 (1948) ;
People v. Cuozzo, 292 N.Y. 85, 54 N.E.2d 20 (1944); Commonwealth v. Lettrich, 346 Pa.
497, 31 A.2d 155 (1943) ; Campbell v. Commonwealth, 194 Va. 825, 75 S.E.2d 468 (1953).
48. Peoples v. State, 256 Ala. 612, 56 So. 2d 665 (1952); People v. Bradford, 95 Cal.
App. 2d 372, 213 P.2d 37 (1949); People v. Manske, 399 Ill. 176, 77 N.E.2d 164 (1948);
People v. Deacons, 109 N.Y. 374, 16 N.E. 676 (1888); Commonwealth v. Turza, 340 Pa.
128, 16 A.2d 401 (1940).
49. As to crimes in which there is no tangible corpus delicti, such as income tax
evasion, it has been held that corroborative evidence must link the accused in order to
show that a crime has been committed. Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147 (1954). See
7 Wigmore, Evidence § 2072 (3d ed. 1940).
50. Manning v. United States, 215 F.2d 945 (10th Cir. 1954); People v. Kinder, 122
Cal. App. 2d 457, 265 P.2d 24 (1954); Commonwealth v. Bishop, 285 Pa. 49, 131 At.
657 (1926). There is no agreement among the various jurisdictions as to quantum of proof
required to prove the corpus delicti. Pennsylvania is the only state requiring the corpus
delicti to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt without using the confession. Gray v.
Commonwealth, 101 Pa. 380 (1882). Most jurisdictions require proof by a preponderance
of the evidence or simply state that prima fade independent proof of the corpus delicti
must be presented. See Note, 103 U. Pa. L. Rev. 638, 659 (1955).
51. Hines v. State, 260 Ala. 668, 72 So. 2d 296 (1954); State v. Guastamachio, 137
Conn. 179, 75 A.2d 429 (1950); People v. Lay, 336 Mich. 77, 57 N.W.2d 453 (1953);
Taylor v. State, 191 Tenn. 670, 235 S.W.2d 818 (1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 918 (1951).
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rarely constitute reversible error provided sufficient proof is introduced
at some point. 52 In fact, there is strong reason for believing that the trial
judge may best determine the order in any given case, and recent deci-
sions evidence a growing faith in the supremacy of judicial discretion.5 3
Decisions are not uncommon which allow confessions to be used to fill
in gaps in the independent proof by lending significance to otherwise un-
important facts.5 4 In a select minority of jurisdictions, a more flexible
doctrine, resembling the English practice, simply requires that some facts
be proven outside the confession which under the circumstances give it
reasonable corroboration. 5
As a general proposition, uncorroborated admissions of incriminating
facts are not sufficient in themselves to sustain a conviction. A recent
California decision, People v. Cullen5 6 typifies the holdings of many
courts that have required corroboration of an accused's admissions. Here
it was held, as a settled rule, that the corpus delicti must be established
independently of an admission of the defendant. Thus a conviction could
not be had on the basis of an extrajudicial admission without other proof
of the corpus delicti. The opinion also noted that upon a prima facie
showing that the alleged victims met death by a criminal agency, the ad-
mission would be received, the order of proof being discretionary. The
court stated that its purpose in so ruling was to protect the defendant
against the possibility of fabricated testimony which might wrongfully
establish the crime and the perpetrator. It is interesting to observe that
the California court requires the corpus delicti to be proved by evidence
independent of such admissions while holding that involuntary admis-
sions need not be excluded. 7
The Supreme Court of the United States has recently declared that an
accused's subsequent admissions of essential facts or elements of the
crime are of the same character as confessions and corroboration should
be required. 8 The court declined to draw any distinction between in-
52. Tingle v. United States, 38 F.2d 573 (8th Cir. 1930); People v. Seymour, 54 Cal.
App. 2d 266, 128 P.2d 726 (1942); Commonwealth v. Lettrich, 346 Pa. 497, 31 A.2d 155
(1943).
53. See, e.g., Manning v. United States, 215 F.2d 945, 952 (10th Cir. 1954), which
quoted from 7 Wigmore, Evidence § 2073, at 404, to the effect that the better view is that
the trial judge may determine the order of evidence.
54. People v. Gavurnik, 2 Ill. 2d 190, 117 N.E.2d 782 (1954); Gallegos v. State, 152
Neb. 831, 43 N.W.2d 1 (1950); People v. Badgley, 16 Wend. 53 (N.Y. 1836); Wheeler v.
Commonwealth, 191 Va. 665, 66 S.E.2d 605 (1951).
55. Logue v. State, 198 Ga. 672, 32 S.E.2d 397 (1944); State v. Campisi, 42 N.J. Super.
138, 126 A.2d 17 (1956). See cases collected in 7 Wigmore, Evidence § 2071 n.3 (3d ed.
1940).
56. 37 Cal. 2d 614, 234 P.2d 1 (1951).
57. See cases cited note 12 supra.
58. Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84 (1954). The following cases have made no
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culpatory and exculpatory statements, concluding that the latter might
call for corroboration to the same extent as other statements material to
guilt or innocence."' Statements or admissions, immaterial with respect
to the guilt or innocence of the accused, were not included within the
scope of the corroboration requirement.
It is almost too clear for argument that an improperly induced admis-
sion from which guilt may be readily inferred is no more trustworthy than
an outright statement- of guilt. Furthermore, in all probability a con-
fession will be reduced to writing and signed by the confessing party,
thus providing some guarantee against fabrication. However, it is not
likely that the average admission will appear in written- form, and oppor-
tunities for exaggeration, if not outright fabrication, are considerable.
Obviously, there are many admissions entering the stream of evidence
which scarcely hint at incriminatory inferences, and no one should suggest
that these admissions be compared with confessions in terms of corrobora-
tion requirements.60 On the other hand, this does not gravitate against a
firm policy of excluding incriminating admissions which remain uncor-
roborated by other convincing evidence. Despite the appeal of the argu-
ment in favor of a corroboration requirement with respect to incrimina-
ting admissions, one still encounters a hard core of decisions which applies
the rule of corroboration to confessions alone." As a rule the distinction
between confessions and admissions is drawn strictly on the basis of
definition, and policy considerations absorb little, if any, consideration.
distinction between confessions and admissions with respect to corroboration require-
ments. United States v: Alker, 260 F.2d 135 (3d Cir. 1958); Gulotta v. United States,
113 F.2d 683 (8th Cir. 1940); State v. Romo, 66 Ariz. 174, 185 P.2d 757 (1947); People
v. La Coco, 406 Ill. 303, 94 N.E.2d 178 (1950); State v. Jones, 150 Me. 242, 108 A.2d 261
(1954); Vanderheiden v. State, 156 Neb. 735, 57 N.W.2d 761 (1953); People v. Aparo,
285 App. Div. 1171, 140 N.Y.S.2d 542 (1955); East v. State, 146 Tex. Crim. 396, 175
S.W.2d 603 (1942). The Supreme Court has ruled that corroboration is unnecessary when
admissions offered in evidence were made prior to the crime inasmuch as they contain
none of the inherent weaknesses of confessions and admissions made after the fact.
Warszower v. United States, 312 U.S. 342 (1941).
59. Some decisions have pointed up a distinction between inculpatory and exculpatory
statements, holding or implying that the latter need not be corroborated. Ercoli v. United
States, 131 F.2d 354 (D.C. Cir. 1942); Braxton v. State, 17 Ala. App. 167, 82 So. 657
(1919).
60. See, e.g., State v. George, 93 N.H. 408, 43 A.2d 256 (1945) (distinguishing between
admissions touching the fact of guilt and the acknowledgment of subordinate facts).
61. See, e.g., State v. Fortune, 196 Iowa 995, 195 N.W. 740 (1923) (interpreting Iowa
Code Ann. § 782.7 (1946)); Hedger v. Commonwealth, 294 Ky. 731, 172 S.W.2d 560
(1943) (interpreting Ky. Crim. Code Ann. § 240 (Baldwin 1953)); Cazaas v. State, 227
Miss. 546, 86 So. 2d 497 (1956). In Massachusetts and Wisconsin, neither confessions nor
admissions require corroboration. Commonwealth v. Di Stasio, 294 Mass. 273, 1 N.E.2d
189 (1936), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 683 (1937); Potman v. State, 259 Wis. 234, 47 N.W.2d
884 (1951).
1959]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
In 1931 the Wickersham Commission reported that the extortion of
confessions by the police through the employment of "third degree" tac-
tics was a common practice.62 In connection with state criminal trials,
the Supreme Court in 1936 for the first time invoked the fourteenth
amendment as a protection against the reception of involuntary confes-
sions.63 Undisputed evidence in this case pointed to the use of extreme
physical force, and in reversing the convictions, the Court held that the
use of confessions thus obtained as a basis for conviction and sentence
was a clear denial of due process. During the next several years, the
Court stood firm in its policy that physical coercion or threats of physical
violence constituted a violation of due process, and convictions obtained
through the employment of physical pressures faced certain reversal.
64
As police methods of interrogation became more subtle and refined and
coercions less obvious and physical, need arose for a more precise defini-
tion of coercion. The opinion by Mr. Justice Black, in Ashcraft v. Tennes-
see,65 filled that need in rejecting a confession obtained after thirty-six
hours of continuous questioning. Through independent examination of
the petitioner's claims, the Court determined unequivocally that psycho-
logical, as well as physical, pressures could be declared "inherently co-
ercive," and thus violative of fundamental concepts of due process. A
year later, in Malinski v. New York,66 the Court ruled that if the undis-
puted evidence suggested that force or coercion was used to extract a
confession, a judgment of conviction would not stand even though without
the confession there might have been sufficient evidence for submission
to the jury. This strong position, demanding automatic reversal, was to
continue unassailed or unquestioned for the greater part of the ensuing
decade.6 7 Obviously, trustworthiness alone would not be sufficient to
62. IV Reports of National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement (1931).
63. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (obvious physical pressures, including
ropings and mob domination).
64. Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547 (1942) (prisoners held incommunicado and threatened
with mob violence); White v. Texas 310 U.S. 530 (1940) (prisoner handcuffed and
whipped); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940) (protracted and searching examina-
tion, though there was conflict upon the issue of physical violence).
65. 322 U.S. 143 (1944). A similar result obtained on subsequent appeal, 327 U.S. 274
(1946). For further discussion of the case, see page 102 supra.
66. 324 U.S. 401 (1945) (four Justices dissenting). See also Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S.
596 (1948) (negro boy of fifteen questioned by police for thirty hours; conviction reversed
in a 5-4 decision).
67. It should be noted that reversal of conviction does not spell absolute acquittal of
the defendant. Subsequent to reversal, the Court has returned all such cases for retrial
without benefit of the coerced confession. The Supreme Court has never had occasion
to decide whether inherently coercive treatment alone without introduction or considera-
tion of a coerced confession or other incriminating evidence at trial will supply reason for
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sustain the validity of a confession obtained by pressures violative of due
process. Given inherently coercive treatment and an extracted confession,
reversal of conviction followed as a matter of course regardless of the
degree of convincing power of the confession and regardless of the valid-
ity of corroborative evidence.
In Stein v. New York,68 Mr. Justice Jackson, speaking for the majority,
affirmed the conviction of three defendants despite their objection that
the confessions of two of them were the products of police brutality.
Under New York procedure-one employed in many jurisdictions-the
trial judge holds a preliminary hearing on the issue of voluntariness. 9 If
he finds that the confession was involuntary, he must exclude it. If he
believes that there is an issue of fact as to whether the confession was
coerced, the confession will go to the jury with instructions that they
may not consider the confession in determining guilt or innocence unless
they find that it was voluntarily given. In the Stein case, the trial judge
determined that there was an issue for the jury to consider and submitted
the confession. There was substantial evidence other than the confessions
pointing to the guilt of the defendants, and the state's evidence on the
issue of coercion was virtually unchallenged, because the defendants
chose to remain silent rather than risk almost certain impeachment. In
appraising the jury verdict of guilty, it was impossible to determine
whether the jury had found the confessions coerced and rejected them,
but predicated guilt on other evidence, or whether they found the con-
fessions voluntary and relied upon them in arriving at their verdict. In
spite of this uncertainty, the Court found the New York practice consti-
tutional and evidence of coercion was examined only to determine whether
the question was properly submitted to the jury.
reversal. The same uncivilized conditions might well prevail, but if police efforts aimed
at obtaining incriminating evidence are unsuccessful, there will be no occasion for dis-
covery of trial error. Minus trial error, it is highly doubtful that reversal could be predi-
cated upon inhumane police investigatory procedures, because reversal in this instance
would spell absolute acquittal. Thus, coercive compulsion might supply a reason for
reversal if evidence obtained thereby be admitted or considered, but the same quantum
of coercion, though shocking the conscience, would not be ground for reversal for lack of
trial error.
68. 346 U.S. 156 (1953). The decision has been widely criticized in legal periodicals.
See Meltzer, Involuntary Confessions: The Allocation of Responsibility Between Judge and
Jury, 21 U. Chi. L. Rev. 317 (1954); Paulsen, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Third
Degree, 6 Stan. L. Rev. 411 (1954); Note, 39 Cornell L.Q. 321 (1954).
69. Under orthodox procedure the trial judge determines whether the confession is
voluntary or involuntary. If he admits the confession, his decision as to voluntariness is
final and is not re-examined by the jury. Under New York procedure, if the judge deter-
mines that a fair question of fact is presented, the issue of voluntariness is submitted to
the jury. Massachusetts procedure is similar to that of New York, except that in Massa-
chusetts admissibility results only if the judge resolves that question in favor of the
prosecution.
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In dissenting, Justices Black, Douglas and Frankfurter contended
that the Court had deviated from its prior decisions by affirming a con-
viction in which a coerced confession was present. On the other hand,
one may reasonably infer that the Court assumed that the jury rejected
the confession, and excluded it from their deliberations if they found it
to be coerced. If so, the case could be treated as if the trial court had
excluded the confession.7 ° This rationalization of the Stein decision may
extend unbounded credit to the jury's ability to sift prejudicial evidence,
yet no other rationalization seems feasible if one is to support the thesis
that Stein does not represent a radical departure from its immediate
precedents.
In a recent decision,71 the Supreme Court reversed a conviction where
a coerced confession constituted part of the evidence before the jury. The
Court ruled that the coerced confession vitiated the judgment of convic-
tion despite the fact that there may have been sufficient evidence, apart
from the coerced confession, to support a judgment of conviction. The
majority opinion noted that there was patent coercion and carefully
pointed out that its decision was not contrary to Stein inasmuch as the
Court, in the latter case, did not find that the confession was coerced.
72
Without doubt, this decision solidifies the position of the Court with
respect to its insistence upon observance of constitutional procedures.
Where the undisputed facts indicate unduly coercive physical or psycho-
logical compulsion in the obtaining of confessions, the interests of the
state must yield to the individual's right to freedom from fear, regardless
of the convincing power of corroborative evidence pointing to certainty
of guilt.73
70. The majority opinion inferred that the rule of automatic reversal will be invoked
if a confession is admitted under the orthodox procedure. If the judge, therefore, makes
a final determination that a confession is admissible, and the ruling admitting the con-
fession is declared erroneous on review, the conviction should fall with the confession. 346
U.S. 156, 192-93 (1953).
71. Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958).
72. The procedure followed in the state court was comparable to the New York pro-
cedure. At the beginning of the trial, petitioner moved to suppress the confession and the
trial judge overruled the motion after a hearing upon the motion. The same evidence was
repeated to the jury and the judge instructed the jury to disregard the confession if they
found that it was not voluntarily made. There was, however, substantial evidence of
coercion which the facts in the Stein case did not reveal.
73. Several decisions since the Stein case have reflected a concerted effort to control
the conduct of criminal trials in state courts. See, e.g., Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191
(1957); Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954); Cranor v. Gonzales, 226 F.2d 83 (9th Cir.
1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 935 (1956). In Thomas v. Arizona, 356 U.S. 390 (1958), the
Court, with four justices dissenting, affirmed a conviction despite a strong aura of threats
and pressures. The trial judge had rejected two written confessions but had admitted a
third confession which was made in relative quiet before a justice of the peace. The
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CONCLUSION
Whether the rule prohibiting reception of coerced confessions will
apply with equal force to the coerced admission remains to be considered.
If the rule is to be extended, reception of the coerced admission into evi-
dence would constitute ground for reversal despite the fact that evi-
dence, outside the admission, strongly suggests guilt. If the criterion for
actioi is posited upon the judicial will to discourage unbridled investi-
gatory practices, then there is no wisdom in a suggestion that distinctions
be drawn between confessions and admissions. Coercion of an admission
by brutal tactics is no less shocking than coercion of a confession by the
same means. The Supreme Court has many times emphasized its concern
for the dignity of the individual, and this concern would be meaningless
if the right to judicial protection were to be predicated upon a choice of
definitions.
It cannot be denied that the prosecutor's side of the argument also has
merit. The rule of automatic reversal would appear doubly frustrating if
every coerced admission posed a potential threat to successful conviction.
Chances of failure would be even greater in federal court if extended
delay, resulting in admission of subordinate facts, were to constitute
ground for reversal.74 Obviously, there are compelling arguments on both
sides. Nevertheless, except for the second Askeraft case75 and a footnote
discussion in Stein,76 authoritative appraisal of the problem has been
lacking.
Objectively considered, the distinction between a confession and an
admission is one of degree and not of kind. While it may be true that
certain admissions are of little consequence in terms of their effect upon
the rights of the individual defendant, a difference in degree does not
justify a separate test for admissibility in all cases. If the defendant has
majority opinion by Justice Clark stresses the fact that nothing in the undisputed record
substantiated the contention that fear of violence overbore the defendant's free will at the
time he appeared before the justice of the peace.
74. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(a) requires that an arrested person be taken before a committing
magistrate "without unnecessary delay." Accordingly, the Supreme Court has announced
that extended delay, resulting in a confession, will constitute ground for reversal of con-
viction if the confession so procured was utilized in procuring conviction. Mallory v.
United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
Reversal is in order despite lack of coercive police action or lack of the usual elements
pointing to untrustworthiness. Though Congress has not explicitly forbidden the use of
evidence so procured, the Supreme Court in supervising the administration of criminal
justice in federal courts has established a definite procedure to be adhered to in all courts
within the federal system. Neither the due process clause nor the equal protection clause
affords any control over state action in this respect. State v. Smith, 158 Kan. 645, 149
P.2d 600 (1944); State v. Lowder, 147 Ohio 530, 72 N.E.2d 785 (1946).
75. Ashcraft v. Tennessee, .327 U.S. 274 (1946). See discussion at page 102 supra.
76. Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 162 n.5 (1953).
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made several admissions, it is quite probable that the statements in ag-
gregate would be as damaging to his cause as an outright confession of
guilt. In this latter instance, the collective force of several admissions
would most certainly raise strong inferences of guilt, and who can validly
assert that the accused will receive a fair and impartial trial if the jury
is permitted to consider his involuntary admissions in arriving at the
verdict of guilt.
If admissions received are truly insignificant, in that they have slight
tendency to incriminate, there is scant reason for requiring a preliminary
showing of voluntariness. By the same token, it would seem unnecessary
to require the prosecution to assume the burden of proving voluntariness
in each instance. Even though undue coercion enters the picture, it would
appear that jury consideration of a minor admission would have little
effect upon the defendant's receiving a fair trial. Once it is agreed that
fundamental constitutional rights are not abridged by violence alone
without the incidence of substantial trial error, 77 the accused can be
assumed to have received a fair trial, despite the fact that statements of
subordinate import have entered the stream of evidence.
In any case, the trial judge should be granted the discretion to de-
termine whether the traditional rules of exclusion applicable to confes-
sions should be applied to the reception of admissions. If he, in his dis-
cretion, finds that an admission strongly suggests an inference of guilt,
he should require a preliminary showing of voluntariness, and in most
instances, it would be proper to relegate the burden of proving volun-
tariness to the prosecution. Involuntary admissions of this order are
likely to be untrustworthy, hence subtle distinctions between confessions
and admissions fail to provide an adequate guide for selecting a sound
policy of admissibility. Furthermore, under certain conditions, a coerced
admission may be just as incriminating as a confession, and there are
few who would claim that the reception of such an admission into evi-
dence would be consistent with contemporary standards of due process.
A workable standard of admissibility necessitates abandonment of the
textbook stereotype which has long perpetuated the belief that confessions
and admissions possess clear and distinguishable characteristics. 7 Prac-
tical solution of the instant problem not only invites serious consideration
of all factors surrounding the making of an admission but compels the
conclusion that substance shall prevail over form.
77. See note 66 supra.
78. The Uniform Rule of Evidence 63(6) makes no distinction between confessions
and admissions but speaks in terms of a "previous statement" by the accused relative to
the offense charged. Statements obtained as a result of compulsion, threats and like pres-
sures are inadmissible under the rule. However, no attempt is made to distinguish between
statements that are definitely incriminating and those relatively colorless with respect to
incriminating content.
